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1. INTRODUCTION: CORAL REEFS ARE SUFFERING FROM OVERUSE
Coral reefs, the "rainforests of the sea," have been estimated to
contribute more than $375 billion annually to the global economy in
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providing ecosystem services.' Despite covering only 0.1% of the
earth's surface, coral reefs are the most diverse marine ecosystem per
unit area on earth.2 Over the last decade, scientists have sounded the
alarm that coral reefs are in trouble.' By one estimate, certain reefs in
the Caribbean Sea have degraded nearly eighty percent from an ecologi-
cally pristine state.' Even the Great Barrier Reef in Australia is losing
coral,' despite extensive and long-standing legal protections.6
There is no single cause of this coral loss. At a local scale, overfish-
ing destabilizes the coral reef ecosystem through the removal of both
large predators and smaller herbivorous fish.' Corals are particularly
sensitive to overfishing of certain groups of fish that graze on algae,
which would otherwise outcompete corals.' Other direct sources of harm
to coral reefs include pollution and fishing methods such as dynamite
fishing or trawling that physically damage coral.' From a global per-
spective, rising sea levels, climate change, and ocean acidification also
threaten future coral survival."o
With reefs facing a multitude of local and global threats, it has
1. John M. Pandolfi et al., Are U.S. Coral Reefs on the Slippery Slope to Slime?, 307 Sci.
1725, 1725 (2005) (citations omitted). Involving both ecology and economics, ecosystem services
are the benefits from "complex interactions among species and their abiotic environment,"
especially benefits that humans enjoy. See, e.g., Brendan Fisher et al., Defining and Classifying
Ecosystem Services for Decision Making, 68 ECOLOGICAL EcoN. 643, 651 (2009). Losses in
ecosystem services result in fishery collapses, beach closures, harmful algal blooms, fish kills,
coastal flooding, and species invasions. See Boris Worm et al., Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on
Ocean Ecosystem Services, 314 Sci. 787, 788-89 (2006).
2. Nancy Knowlton et al., Coral Reef Biodiversity, in LIFB IN THE WORLD's OCEANS:
DIVERsrrY, DIsTRmUTION, AND ABUNDANCE 65, 65 (Alasdair McIntyre ed., 2010) (citations
omitted).
3. See, e.g., David R. Bellwood et al., Confronting the Coral Reef Crisis, 429 NATURE 827,
827 (2004).
4. John M. Pandolfi et al., Global Trajectories of the Long-Term Decline of Coral Reef
Ecosystems, 301 Sci. 955, 957 (2003).
5. Glenn De'ath et al., The 27-Year Decline of Coral Cover on the Great Barrier Reef and
Its Causes, 109 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 17,995, 17,996 (2012).
6. Australia first protected the Great Barrier Reef by law in 1975. Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park Act 1975 (Austl.). The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority now manages 344,400
square kilometers through a comprehensive multi-use zoning scheme. Austl. Gov't, Facts About
the Great Barrier Reef, GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK AuTrHORY, http://www.gbrmpa.
gov.au/about-the-reef/facts-about-the-great-barrier-reef (last visited Dec. 23, 2012).
7. See Bellwood, supra note 3, at 830 (citations omitted).
8. Id.
9. Clive R. Wilkinson, Global and Local Threats to Coral Reef Functioning and Existence:
Review and Predictions, 50 MARINE & FRESHWATER REs. 867, 871-73 (1999) (citations omitted).
10. Because coral reefs rely on symbiotic algae living inside coral tissue for food production,
corals are highly light dependent. Future projections of sea level rise over the next century include
rates that exceed anticipated coral reef growth rates, which may result in local reef drowning. See
Nancy Knowlton, The Future of Coral Reefs, 98 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 5419, 5422 (2001). See
generally Ove Hoegh-Guldberg et al., Coral Reefs Under Rapid Climate Change and Ocean
Acidification, 318 Sci. 1737 (2007), for an explanation of how corals, which require specific
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become increasingly clear that creative solutions are necessary to
address these threats. The global consumption of fossil fuels and other
anthropogenic activities cause climate change, rising sea levels, and
ocean acidification," and will consequently require a more global solu-
tion than is proposed here. Instead, this Note will focus entirely on
addressing local threats to coral reefs. One of the most important local
problems is overuse, particularly overfishing.12 Destructive fishing
methods, dredging, and physical damage from boats and swimmers also
directly damage coral reefs.13
Such overuse is an example of what Garret Hardin famously called
the "tragedy of the commons." 4 In the tragedy of the commons,
resources that are freely open to all users suffer from overuse and abuse.
In a system free of any rules, individual actors have no incentive to
protect the resources, but only seek to maximize individual gain." In a
world where resources are limited, "[fireedom in a commons brings ruin
to all."16 The only way to prevent this tragedy is to restrict access
through the development of private property rights or governmental
regulation. 17
Commentators frequently consider the oceans and marine resources
a classic example of the commons feared by Hardin.' 8 Corals are unique
in the marine environment, and thus a commons that is uniquely difficult
to protect. As organisms whose skeletal structure serves as the basis for
the ecosystem they support,' 9 corals cannot simply be protected as indi-
vidual organisms. Effective protection of corals requires a more holistic
approach to avert the tragedy of the commons. Existing laws in the
United States are therefore ill-equipped to address coral management.
In this Note, I argue that coral reefs, which are traditionally pro-
environmental conditions in order to grow, are expected to suffer from altered oceanic chemistry
and increased temperatures.
11. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 30, 36-37, 52 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-reportlar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf; see also Hoegh-Guldberg, supra note 10, at 1737.
12. See Jeremy B.C. Jackson et al., Historical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of Coastal
Ecosystems, 293 Sci. 629, 631-34 (2001); see also Pandolfi et al., supra note 4, at 957.
13. See, e.g., John M. McManus et al., Effects of Some Destructive Fishing Methods on Coral
Cover and Potential Rates of Recovery, 21 ENVTL. MGMT. 69, 75-76 (1997); see also Walter C.
Jaap, Coral Reef Restoration, 15 ECOLOGICAL ENG'G 345, 347 (2000).
14. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1234, 1244 (1968).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1247.
18. See, e.g., ROGNVALDUR HANNESON, THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE OCEANS 1 (2004) ("The
oceans are, or were, the last commons."); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private
Ordering in Marine Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 9, 11-12 (2002).
19. See, e.g., CHARLEs R.C. SHEPPARD ET AL., THE BIOLOGY OF CORAL REEFS, 1-2 (2009).
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tected by the public trust doctrine, can be privately managed as an addi-
tional conservation tool. Although the public trust doctrine generally
governs marine resource management, Florida law allows leases of sub-
merged lands, particularly for the aquaculture of shellfish and live rock.
A similar lease could be granted over an existing coral reef, giving the
lessee the right to exclude other users and providing a solution to Har-
din's tragedy. Nor would such leases be a unique privatization of
resources in the public trust, as evidenced by oil and gas leases on the
outer continental shelf and fishing management schemes that restrict
access by other users.
Part II discusses the existing legal framework regarding coral pro-
tection at the federal and state level.2 0 Part III reviews the public trust
doctrine, an important principle underlying the use of all marine
resources in the United States. In Part IV, I propose a new model for
coral reef conservation in Florida by leasing coral reefs to conservation
groups in Florida. Part V surveys existing examples of privatized marine
resources in the United States, including offshore energy extraction and
the novel fishing management tool of individualized transfer quotas
("ITQs"). These examples will serve to compare and contrast different
elements of the effects of marine resource privatization, an alternative to
governance, which has thus far done little to avert the tragedy of the
commons as far as corals are concerned.
II. EXISTING U.S. AND FLORIDA LAWS FAIL TO FULLY
PROTECT CORAL REEFS
Despite the number of statutes that nominally protect corals, these
laws are generally patchy in their coverage and effectiveness. Like many
issues in ocean and coastal policy, coral reef conservation has suffered
from the "endemic fragmentation of governance."21 Of the 140 federal
laws that address ocean and coastal policy in effect as of 2004,22 only a
handful of laws are potentially related to coral conservation.2 3 Of inter-
20. For the sake of simplicity, this Note will focus on Florida reefs, and consequently, Florida
laws. However, United States coral reefs are found in the waters of Florida, Hawaii, Texas,
Louisiana, and several Caribbean and Pacific territories. NOAA/NCCOS CTR. FOR THE COASTAL
MONITORING & ASSESSMENT'S BIOGEOGRAPHY TEAm, THE STATE OF CORAL REEF ECOSYSTEMS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND PACIFIC FREELY ASSOCIATED STATES: 2008, at 2 (2008), available at
http://ccma.nos.noaa.gov/ecosystems/coralreef/coral2008/pdf/CoralReport2008.pdf [hereinafter
STATE OF CORAL REEF ECOSYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES].
21. Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States' Exclusive Economic
Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public
Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 4-5 (2009).
22. Id. at 4 n.6.
23. See Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (2006); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006); Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982, 16 U.S.C
192 [Vol. 68:189
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est to this Note are the Coral Reef Conservation Act of 2000,24 the
Endangered Species Act,25 and the National Marine Sanctuaries Act.26
In addition to the federal laws, there are several Florida laws that govern
coral reefs as well.2 7
A. The Coral Reef Conservation Act of 2000
Responding to stalled congressional attempts to pass comprehen-
sive coral protection legislation, President Bill Clinton signed Executive
Order No. 13,089 in 1998.28 The order contained lofty goals-prevent-
ing federal agencies from harming coral reefs and requiring agencies to
improve reef ecosystems.29 It also created the Coral Reef Task Force,
which recommended protecting twenty percent of United States' coral
reefs from all fishing through the implementation of no-take marine
reserves. 30
Congress passed the Coral Reef Conservation Act of 2000
("CRCA") 31 to give the executive order and the Coral Reef Task Force
more legal teeth.32 However, the CRCA has largely failed to live up to
these hopes, 3 perhaps because of the political process present in the
passage of the CRCA that was otherwise lacking in Executive Order
Number 13,089. The Act gave the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
§§ 3501-3510 (2006); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, id. §§ 1451-1456; Coral Reef
Conservation Act of 2000, id. §§ 6401-6509; Endangered Species Act, id. §§ 1531-1544;
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, id. §§ 1801-1891;
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (National Marine Sanctuaries Act), id.
§§ 1431-1445(a); Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990 and
National Invasive Species Act, id. §§ 4701-4751.
Additionally, President George W. Bush recently used the Antiquities Act (16 U.S.C. § 431)
to create the Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument in 2006, and the Rose Atoll Marine
National Monument, the Marianas Trench National Monument, and the Pacific Remote Islands
National Monument in 2009. See, e.g., Alison Rieser & Jon M. Van Dyke, New Marine National
Monuments Settle issues, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 50, 50 (2009).
24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 6401-6409.
25. Id. §§ 1531-1544.
26. Id. §§ 1431-1445(a).
27. See infra Part II.D.
28. Robin Kundis Craig, The Coral Reef Task Force: Protecting the Environment Through
Executive Order, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,343, 10,345-47 (2000).
29. Exec. Order No. 13,089, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,701 (June 11, 1998); see also Robin Kundis
Craig, Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine
Reserves in Florida and Hawaii, 34 McGEORGE L. REv. 155, 214-15 (2003) [hereinafter Craig,
Marine Wilderness Protection].
30. Craig, Marine Wilderness Protection, supra note 29 at 215. A no-take marine reserve
prohibits all extractive use of marine resources within the reserve. See, e.g., NOAA'S MARINE
PROTECTED AREAS CENTER, MARINE RESERVES IN THE UNITED STATEs (2011), available at http://
www.mpa.gov/pdf/helpful-resources/factsheets/us-marinereserves.pdf.
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 6401-6409 (2006).
32. Craig, Marine Wilderness Protection, supra note 29, at 217.
33. Id. at 219.
2013] 193
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Administration ("NOAA"), an agency more responsive to congressional
pressure than the presidentially-created Coral Reef Task Force, primary
authority over coral conservation.3 4 More fundamentally, the Act
reflects struggles between two often-conflicting interests: conservation
and fishing." Finally, a bill to reauthorize CRCA is lingering in Con-
gress, despite bipartisan support.3 6
Thirteen years after the passage of the CRCA, has the United States
met the Coral Reef Task Force's goal of protecting twenty percent of
United States corals with no-take marine reserves? Although one report
indicates that twenty-four percent of United States coral reefs are pro-
tected by no-take reserves, this figure is misleading." It comes from a
survey of Marine Protected Areas ("MPAs"), a broadly defined term that
"refers to a range of types of MPAs, from multiple-use areas that allow
fishing or other uses, to 'no-take reserves' where extractive uses are pro-
hibited."3 8 Although twenty-four percent of these MPAs that specifically
protect corals are no-take reserves, there is no indication as to how much
actual area this figure includes and thus what percentage of United
States' coral reefs are protected by no-take reserves. It only indicates
that twenty-four percent of U.S. MPAs that protect corals are no-take
reserves.
Elsewhere, NOAA is more transparent about the relative rarity of
no-take reserves in the United States: three percent of all U.S. waters are
protected by no-take marine reserves, ninety-five percent of which are in
the Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument in Hawaii." And
U.S. coral health is in decline overall.4 0 So while the Coral Reef Task
Force's quantitative goal may have been dubiously satisfied, corals have
not benefitted significantly from the CRCA.
B. The Endangered Species Act
Congress passed the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") in 1973 "to
34. Id. at 217. To be fair, granting NOAA authority to oversee the Coral Reef Management
Act may also have been an easy way to realize the recommendations of the Coral Reef Task
Force.
35. Robin Kundis Craig, Coral Reefs, Fishing, and Tourism: Tensions in U.S. Ocean Law and
Policy Reform, 27 STANFORD ENvT.. L.J. 3, 26-27 (2008) [hereinafter Craig, Tensions in U.S.
Ocean Policy].
36. NOAA, Reauthorization Archives: 112th Congress, CORAL REEF CONSERVATION
PRoGRAM (Jan. 11, 2013), http://coralreef.noaa.gov/aboutcrcp/strategy/reauthorization/archive/.
37. NOAA CORAL REEF CONSERVATION PROGRAM, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF MARINE
PROTECTED AREAS IN CORAL REEF EcoSYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (2007), available at
http://data.nodc.noaa.gov/coris/library/NOAA/CRCP/project/I1188/us-reefsmpastatusreport
volI_2004.pdf.
38. Id.
39. See Rieser & Van Dyke, supra note 23, at 50.
40. STATE OF CORAL REEF ECOSYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 20, at 5.
194 [Vol. 68:1.89
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provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered ...
and threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program
for the conservation of such endangered . .. and threatened species, and
to take such steps as may be appropriate to" prevent the extinction of
such species.4 1 Considered one of the most protective environmental
laws in the world,42 the ESA places the interests of protected species
above those of most federal agencies and federally-funded projects.
Once a species is designated as endangered or threatened under the Act,
federal agencies are generally barred from taking action that may "jeop-
ardize the continued existence" or cause the "destruction or adverse
modification" of the protected species and its critical habitat. 4 3 Further-
more, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and NOAA's
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NFMS"), the agencies charged with
overseeing the ESA, are required to designate critical habitat for pro-
tected species.4 4
Historically, FWS and NFMS have listed far more terrestrial and
freshwater species than marine species.45 But in 2006, NFMS listed two
Caribbean coral species, elkhorn coral (Acropora palmata) and staghorn
coral (Acropora cervicornis) as threatened.4 6 Historically, these two spe-
cies were the most important reef building species in the Caribbean; dur-
ing the 1980s, some local populations declined by eighty to ninety-seven
percent.4 7 NFMS further designated critical habitat for these corals in
2008.48 Currently, the critical habitat for these species includes most of
the Florida Keys Reef Tract in which acroporid species have been found,
as well as areas off the coasts of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.4 9 Furthermore, in late 2012, NFMS proposed elevating the sta-
tus of the two acroporid species to endangeredo and listing an additional
sixty-four coral species, including seven Caribbean species, as either
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).
42. REED F. Noss ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF CONSERVATION PLANNING 1 (1997).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
44. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A). Federal agencies must designate critical habitat according to "the best
scientific data available." Id. § 1533(b)(2).
45. Craig, Tensions in U.S. Ocean Policy, supra note 35, at 18.
46. Final Listing Determinations for Elkhorn Coral and Staghorn Coral, 71 Fed. Reg. 89,
26,852, 26,852 (May 9, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223).
47. Proposed Threatened Status For Elkhorn Coral and Staghorn Coral, 70 Fed. Reg. 88,
24,359, 24,360 (May 9, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223). Scientists attribute this drastic
die-off to a combination of factors, including hurricanes, the outbreak of new coral diseases, and
the collapse of the keystone species, the long-spined sea urchin (Diadema antillarum). See Toby
A. Gardner et al., Long-Term Region-Wide Declines in Caribbean Corals, 301 Sci. 958, 959-60
(2003).
48. Critical Habitat for Threatened Elkhorn and Staghorn Corals, 73 Fed. Reg. 229, 72,237
(Nov. 26, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 223 and 226).
49. Id. at 72,237-40.
50. Proposed Listing Determination for 82 Coral Species and Reclassification of Acropora
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endangered or threatened."
Despite designation under the ESA, the ESA does not provide ideal
protection for Caribbean corals for several reasons. For one, the ESA
treats vertebrates and invertebrates, the class to which corals belong,
separately. The ESA protects species of fish, wildlife, and plants, as well
as "any distinct population segment of vertebrate fish or wildlife."5 2
This usage arose from a legislative compromise to provide more fine-
tuned protection for vertebrate species whose populations were dimin-
ished in only parts of their range." This distinction means that an inver-
tebrate species must be endangered or threatened across all or a
significant portion of its range in order to merit protection under the
ESA, but distinct subpopulations of vertebrates may be protected under
the ESA.54 NFMS recognized this challenge in its 2012 decision to list
sixty-six-of eighty-three proposed species in a petition filed by the
Center for Biological Diversity-coral species under the ESA.55 Ulti-
mately, the distinction between vertebrates and invertebrates means that
certain invertebrates that may be in need of protection, but not
necessarily threatened or endangered throughout their entire range, may
not be listed under the ESA.56
Another concern is that the only currently listed Caribbean coral
species are designated as threatened, instead of the more protective clas-
sification of endangered. Under Section Nine of the ESA, only endan-
gered species, and not threatened species, are protected against
takings." If passed, NFMS's 2012 proposal may list seven Caribbean
palmata and Acropora cervicornis, 77 Fed. Reg. 236, 73,220, 73,253 (Dec. 7 2012) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pts. 223 and 224) [hereinafter Proposed Listing Determination for 82 Coral Species].
51. Id. at 73,248. The proposed endangered Caribbean corals are: boulder star coral
(Montastraea annularis); mountainous star coral (Montastraea faveolata); pillar coral
(Dendrogyra cylindrus); rough cactus coral (Mycetophyllia ferox); and star coral (Montastraea
franksi). The two proposed threatened Caribbean species are Lamarck's sheet coral (Agaricia
lamarki) and elliptical star coral (Dichoenia stokesii). NOAA Fisheries Service, NOAA Proposes
Listing 66 Reef-Building Coral Species Under the Endangered Species Act, OFFICE OF PROTECTED
RESOURCEs (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/invertebrates/corals.htm.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2006) (emphasis added).
53. See, e.g., David S. Pennock & Walter W. Dimmick, Critique of the Evolutionary
Significant Unit as a Definition for "Distinct Population Segments" Under the U.S. Endangered
Species Act, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 611, 612 (1997). Although the House of Representatives
did not intend to lessen protections for invertebrate species, the provision of the 1978
Amendments to the ESA allows more discretion in designating critical habitat for invertebrates.
H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, 16-17 (1978).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20).
55. See Proposed Listing Determination for 82 Coral Species, supra note 50, at 73,246.
56. Pennock & Dimmick, supra note 53, at 616. Furthermore, current regulations under the
ESA barely contemplate protection of the larval stage of coral life cycles. See generally Ryan
Kelly, Spineless Wonders: How Listing Marine Invertebrates and Their Larvae Challenges the US
Endangered Species Act, 19 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (2011).
57. § 1538(a)(1). "Take" is defined as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
196 [Vol. 68:189
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corals as endangered, protecting these species from takings." However,
under current law, only federal agencies are barred from harming corals;
individuals and state or local governments that harm threatened species
do not violate the ESA.59
Moreover, the initial critical habitat designation for the two acro-
porid species was controversial. NFMS failed to initially establish criti-
cal habitat, stating that "[t]he designation of critical habitat is not
determinable at this time due to the extremely complex and physical
requirements of these two acroporid species."60 When NFMS finally did
designate critical habitat, it did not set standards for water quality or
water temperature, two important factors for environmentally-sensitive
corals. 6 1 Despite NOAA's recognition that water pollution from the Gulf
of Mexico, Florida Bay, and southern Florida potentially damages reefs
throughout the Florida Keys, NOAA has failed to regulate water temper-
ature or quality for corals' benefit.62 Additionally, ongoing efforts to
restore the Florida Everglades could potentially degrade water quality in
the critical habitat.6 3 Thus, current critical habitat designation for the
two threatened acroporid species does not fully consider environmental
factors necessary for these species' continued existence.
Finally, despite a stated holistic intent to protect ecosystems, the
ESA does not actually provide ecosystem protection.' After a brief
appearance in the stated purpose,65 the word "ecosystem" is absent from
the rest of the statute's text.6 6 The ESA's focus on individual species
protection comes up particularly short in the context of protecting corals,
which are not only individual animals, but also serve as the basis for the
coral reef ecosystem.6 7 Because corals depend on healthy populations of
capture, or collect [an endangered species], or attempt to engage in any such conduct." Id.
§ 1532(19).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1); see also Craig, Tensions in U.S. Ocean Policy, supra note 35, at
19.
60. Final Listing Determinations for Elkhorn Coral and Staghorn Coral, 71 Fed. Reg. 89,
26,852, 26,860 (May 9, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223).
61. Blake Armstrong, Note, Maintaining the World's Marine Biodiversity: Using the
Endangered Species Act to Stop the Climate Change Induced Loss of Coral Reefs, 18 HASTINGS
W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 429, 441 (2012). The Center for Biological Diversity filed a
lawsuit in 2008 against NFMS, arguing that NFMS's failure to consider these variables was not
based on the "best available science," and was therefore arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 442.
62. Final Listing Determinations for Elkhorn Coral and Staghorn Coral, 71 Fed. Reg. at
26,855.
63. Robin Kundis Craig, Acropora spp.: Water Flow, Water Quality, and Threatened Florida
Corals, 8 NAT. REs. & ENV'T. 8, 11 (2007).
64. Craig, Tensions in U.S. Ocean Policy, supra note 35, at 19.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).
66. Noss ET AL., supra note 42, at 1.
67. See, e.g., SHEPPARD ET AL., supra note 19, at 1-2.
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other species living on reefs,6 8 protecting corals alone from takings does
not necessarily significantly protect corals.6 9
Under the current status of the ESA as applied to corals, two spe-
cies receive minimal protection; NFMS's proposed listing, if passed,
may expand the ESA's reach over corals significantly. However, even
the proposed listing of sixty-four additional species and status elevation
of certain species may not be enough to reverse the decline of U.S. coral
reefs. The ESA's focus on species, rather than ecosystems, is inadequate
to address the complex biological and environmental needs of coral
reefs. To provide more useful protection, NFMS must consider these
needs more seriously in the future.
C. The National Marine Sanctuaries Act
Congress passed the National Marine Sanctuaries Act ("NMSA")70
in response to public outrage against the heavily publicized dumping of
nerve gas, oil waste, and other pollutants in Florida waters and the 1968
Santa Barbara oil spill." Although the immediate goals of the early bills
were to completely ban oil drilling in such environmentally sensitive
and recreationally popular areas, what emerged as the final NMSA was
more complex: marine sanctuaries are "protected for multiple uses and
subject to a great deal of public and legislative input. In short, Congress
appears to have intended the NMSA to serve as a kind of Organic Act
for an entirely new system of underwater national parks."72
Under the Act, NOAA may designate marine areas based on "con-
servation, recreational, ecological, historical, scientific, cultural,
archaeological, educational, or aesthetic qualities . . . ."73 National
Marine Sanctuary designation protects the resources therein from unlaw-
ful destruction or removal.7 4 There are currently thirteen National
Marine Sanctuaries, including the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctu-
ary stretching across the Florida Keys Reef Tract.
68. See, e.g., Bellwood, supra note 3, at 830; Gardner et al., supra note 47, at 959-60.
69. Recall that only corals that are listed as endangered are protected from takes
(§ 1538(a)(1)), and that no coral species are yet listed as endangered. See, e.g., Proposed Listing
Determination for 82 Coral Species, supra note 50, at 73,220, 73,253.
70. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445b (2006).
71. Michael C. Blumm & Joel G. Blumstein, The Marine Sanctuaries Program: A
Framework for Critical Areas Management in the Sea, 8 ENVTL. L. REP. 50,016, 50,018 (1978).
72. Jeff Brax, Zoning the Oceans: Using the National Marine Sanctuaries Act and the
Antiquities Act to Establish Marine Protection Areas and Marine Reserves in America, 29
ECOLOGY L.Q. 71, 82 (2002) (citations omitted).
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1433(a).
74. Id. § 1436(a).
75. NOAA, National Marine Sanctuaries: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT'L MARINE
SANc-ruAREs, http://sanctuaries.noaa.gov/about/faqs/welcome.html (last updated Jan. 22, 2013).
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As a means of protecting coral reefs, NMSA may be one of the
stronger acts, but it rarely has been exercised to its full potential.
Because it "emphatically encourages multiple uses" of protected areas,
no-take marine reserves are the exception, rather than the rule under
NMSA. 76 Consequently, fishing and other extractive activities continue
throughout much of waters otherwise protected by NMSA. Additionally,
designation of sanctuaries is a difficult and lengthy process, 7 and may
result in something other than a National Marine Sanctuary, such as a
Marine National Monument. One early commentator suggested that
the Antiquities Act,7 9 a previously dormant statute allowing the Presi-
dent to unilaterally designate national monuments, be used to create
more marine reserves in place of NMSA.so Indeed, President Bush used
the Antiquities Act in 2006 and in 2009 to create the largest marine
reserves in U.S. waters, sidestepping NMSA entirely."'
Because NMSA encourages multi-use zoning in spaces protected
under the Act, few no-take marine reserves are created under NMSA;
recent no-take marine reserves have been designated through other chan-
nels.8 2 These no-take marine reserves, the gold standard of coral conser-
76. Craig, Tensions in U.S. Ocean Policy, supra note 35, at 15. Professor Craig notes that the
Dry Tortugas Ecological Reserve is one of the few, if only, fully protected no-take marine
reserves under NMSA. Id. at 14-15. Established in 2001, the Dry Tortugas Ecological Reserve
was not originally part of the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary (established in 1990) due to
objections of fishing interests. Craig, Marine Wilderness Protection, supra note 29, at 235. One of
the most important reasons that the Reserve was eventually able to close the area to all fishing and
most diving and snorkeling was its relative isolation from land compared to the rest of the Florida
Keys National Marine Sanctuary. Joanne Delaney, Community Capacity Building in the
Designation of the Tortugas Ecological Reserve, 14 GULF & CARIBBEAN RES. 163, 168 (2003).
Increased isolation means fewer users interested in fishing, diving, and other extractive uses of the
Reserve. Id.
However, the Reserve has since become enmeshed with the Dry Tortugas National Park
Research Natural Area, complicating the management of this area. The Florida Keys National
Marine Sanctuary surrounds the Dry Tortugas Ecological Reserve, but the Dry Tortugas National
Park Research Natural Area is jointly managed by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission and the National Park Service, which are separate entities from the National Marine
Sanctuary Program. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE & THE FLORIDA FISH & WILDLIFE
CONSERVATION COMMISSION, IMPLEMENTING THE DRY TORTUGAS NATIONAL PARK RESEARCH
NATURAL AREA SCIENCE PLAN: THE FIVE-YEAR REPORT, inside cover, iii (2012), available at
http://www.nps.gov/ever/naturescience/upload/DRTORNA5YrFINALComplete0492012LoRes.
pdf.
77. See, e.g., Brax, supra note 72, at 85-90.
78. Craig, Tensions in U.S. Ocean Policy, supra note 35, at 16 (noting that the Florida Keys
National Marine Sanctuary Act was created through special legislation and that the proposed
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands National Marine Sanctuary ultimately became a Marine National
Monument under the Antiquities Act).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2006).
80. Brax, supra note 72, at 123-27.
81. See Rieser & Van Dyke, supra note 23, at 50.
82. See supra note 78.
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vation," are a valuable solution to the tragedy of the commons: by
excluding all users, the commons are not subject to use by anyone.
D. Florida Laws
Florida has several laws and regulations specifically governing
coral reefs, but these are generally ineffective, inefficient, or both. For
example, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection manages
habitats,84 while the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commis-
sion ("FWC") governs living resources, including both fish and coral.ss
Because corals are living resources that create habitat for other living
resources, they fall squarely between the jurisdiction of both agencies.
Additionally, Florida's public trust doctrine strongly protects the right to
fish, with certain statutory exceptions." As a result, Florida's govern-
ment vis-A-vis coral conservation is fragmented and prioritizes fishing
interests above conservation.
Florida does have an Endangered Species Program that is distinct
from the federal ESA.87 Despite recognition that Florida has the greatest
number of endangered and threatened species in the continental United
States," Florida law provides little protection beyond the federal ESA.
In the ESA and the equivalent regulations under Florida law, the lan-
guage that defines "take" is essentially the same, although Florida's reg-
ulation provides a clearer definition.89 Perhaps in recognition of the lack
of meaningful protection afforded to imperiled species, FWC recently
announced that it would begin drafting management plans for the sixty
species protected by the Florida law.90
There are two substantive differences between the federal ESA and
Florida's equivalent law and regulations that are relevant to this discus-
sion. Unlike the federal ESA as managed by NFMS, Florida regulations
prevent the taking of state-listed threatened species.9' Additionally, there
83. See, e.g., Bellwood et al., supra note 3, at 831.
84. See, e.g., Coral Reef Conservation Program, FLA. DEP'T ENVTL. PROTECTION, htti /
www.dep.state.fl.us/coastal/programs/corall (last updated Feb. 4, 2013).
85. See, e.g., Saltwater Conservation Programs, FLA. FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION
COMM'N, http://myfwc.com/conservation/saltwater/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
86. FLA. STAT. § 379.244(1) (2010).
87. Id. § 379.2291 (2011).
88. Id. § 379.2291(2).
89. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006) ("The term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct.") with
FLA. ADMIN. CODE r.68A-27.001 (2012) (defining "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in such conduct. The term 'harm' in
the definition of take means an act which actually kills or injures fish or wildlife .... .").
90. A New Conservation Model for Florida Species, FLA. FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION
COMM'N, http://myfwc.com/wildlifehabitats/imperiled/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
91. FLA. ADMIN CODE r.68A-27.003(2)(a). This regulation provides more protection to
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is one species of coral, pillar coral (Dendrogyra cylindrus), that is cur-
rently listed as threatened under Florida's Endangered and Threatened
Species Act.9 2 However, NFMS recently proposed listing this species as
endangered under the federal ESA, potentially removing this disparity
between federal and state law.9
Finally, Florida has an additional statute, the Coral Reef Protection
Act, specifically targeted at protecting coral reefs.94 This statute is lim-
ited in scope, banning only vessel groundings on reefs and requiring
compensation for any such damage caused by vessel groundings.95 The
statute expresses no concern for ecosystem-level management of coral
reefs.
Overall, the existing legal structure protecting Florida corals has
done little to prevent the decline of Caribbean coral reefs. Current fed-
eral and state statutes have a nominal, if any, interest in ecosystem man-
agement in the way that corals need. "Nearly three decades of federal
regulation have failed to provide for the sustainable utilization of
America's marine resources."9 6 Governance, one solution to the tragedy
of the commons, has not protected coral reefs. Privatization may be in
order.97 Such privatization can co-exist with the public trust doctrine,
which protects resources for the general public.
III. PRIVATE LEASES AND FLORIDA'S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is an ancient concept in American com-
mon law. It protects certain natural resources by requiring the state to
maintain the resources for use by the public." As part of the rise of the
environmental movement in the United States, the public trust doctrine
enjoyed a revival sparked by the publication of Professor Sax's article in
1970.99 While generally important to modern environmental law, the
public trust doctrine is especially prominent in the marine environment
because the public trust has historically protected the rights of naviga-
species listed as threatened under Florida's Endangered and Threatened Species Act than to
species listed as threatened under the federal ESA.
92. Id. at r.68A-27.003(2)(g).
93. Proposed Listing Determination for 82 Coral Species, supra note 50, at 73,248.
94. FLA. STAT. § 403.93345 (2010). Florida has also prohibited the removal or damage of
corals in John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park in Key Largo. Id. § 258.083 (2012).
95. Id. § 403.93345.
96. Adler, supra note 18, at 10.
97. Id. at 12-14 (citations omitted); see also infra Part IV.
98. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
99. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); see also JACK H. ARCHER ET AL.,
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS 1-4 (1994)
(reviewing the rise of the environmental movement in the United States and the public trust
doctrine's role in that rise).
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tion, commerce, and fishing.10 Florida has expanded the role of private
entities in managing public trust resources by creating leases of sub-
merged lands for aquaculture.'0 Thus, Florida's public trust doctrine
expressly incorporates private use for the public's benefit.
A. History of the Public Trust Doctrine in the United States
Stemming from Roman and English law, property rights over riv-
ers, seashores, and seas fall under the public trust. 102 Under the public
trust doctrine, the state serves as trustee of natural resources for the pub-
lic.os As the Supreme Court explained in 1892, "it is a title different in
character from that which the state holds in lands intended for sale."1 '
This doctrine traditionally protects the rights of navigation, commerce,
and fishing for the people of the state, "freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties." 105
Scholars have debated the extent of a federal public trust doc-
trine-or whether it even exists separately from that of the states' public
trust doctrines. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court stated that the public trust doctrine prevented the sale of sub-
merged lands in Lake Michigan to a private corporation.10 6 Not only was
Illinois the proper titleholder of this property, but the Court also recog-
nized that the United States' navigational interests derived from the
Commerce Clause."0 ' For Professor Craig and other scholars, this case
stands as a clear pronouncement of a federal public trust doctrine.'0o
However, Dr. Turnipseed and her colleagues argue that there is no
explicit federal public trust doctrine,'" suggesting that the navigational
servitude of Illinois Central Railroad complicates the express acknowl-
edgment of a federal public trust doctrine."10
What is clear is that the federal public trust doctrine, however
explicit or implicit it may be, is largely defined by state ownership of
submerged lands."' The original thirteen colonies adopted the public
100. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452.
101. See Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 829 (Fla. 1909).
102. See Sax, supra note 99, at 475.
103. See, e.g., Turnipseed et al., supra note 21, at 8.
104. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 463.
107. Id. at 463-64.
108. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications ofStates, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENvn. L. REv. 1, 4
Fall 2007 [hereinafter Craig, Eastern Public Trust]. See also Turnipseed et al., supra note 21, at
41 n.235.
109. Turnipseed et al., supra note 21, at 40.
110. Id. at 40-46.
111. See, e.g., Craig, Eastern Public Trust, supra note 108, at 5. See also Robin Kundis Craig,
202 [Vol. 68:189
RENT A REEF?
trust doctrine as part of a larger reliance on English common law.1 12
States that subsequently entered the Union obtained title to tidal and
navigable waters under the Equal Footing Doctrine."' Although every
state has some form of the public trust doctrine, the doctrine differs
between the eastern and western states in certain aspects. Broadly speak-
ing, the western states have been far more protective of public rights in
fresh waters because of the relative scarcity of fresh water east of the
Hundredth Meridian, the "water divide" of the United States." 4 By com-
parison, the eastern states have generally recognized more coastal
rights,"'5 expanding beyond navigation, commerce, and fishing to
include swimming, bathing, recreation, pleasure boating, and other
activities. 116
Although the public trust doctrine evolved as a branch of common
law, the Supreme Court recognized early on that Congress has the right
to impose statutory constraints on the public trust doctrine:
It is the settled law of this country that ownership of and dominion
and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits
of the several states, belong to the respective states within which they
are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion
thereof, when that can be done without substantial impairment of the
interest of the public in the waters, and subject always to the para-
mount right of congress to control their navigation so far as may be
necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and
among the states.1 7
In 1953, the United States first exercised that right when Congress for-
mally granted title to the States of submerged lands within three nautical
miles of the shoreline and "the natural resources within such lands and
waters" under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953.18
B. The Public Trust Doctrine in Florida
Originally a Spanish territory, Florida inherited some Spanish legal
traditions upon joining the United States. Res communes, a civil law
A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private
Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010)
[hereinafter Craig, Western States' Public Trust].
112. See, e.g., Craig, Eastern Public Trust, supra note 108, at 4 (citations omitted).
113. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845).
114. Craig, Western States' Public Trust, supra note 11, at 56.
115. Id.
116. Craig, Eastern Public Trust, supra note 108, at 13 (citations omitted).
117. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
118. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301; 1311-12 (2006). However, the federal government explicitly retained
a navigational servitude and a right to regulate under the Commerce Clause even over state
waters. Id. § 1314.
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equivalent to the public trust doctrine, 119 protected natural resources,
including navigable waters, for the crown. Unless the crown passed a
law to the contrary, "the public navigable waters and submerged lands
and tide lands in the provinces [e.g., Florida] were held in dominion by
the crown as res communes and used as res omnium, and sales and
grants of such lands to individuals were contrary to the general laws and
customs of the realm."l 20 When Florida entered the United States in
1845, Florida traded the Spanish civil law res communes doctrine for the
common law public trust doctrine of the original thirteen colonies under
the Equal Footing Doctrine.'
Since joining the Union, Florida has relied increasingly on common
law, its constitution, and its statutes to expand the public trust doctrine
beyond its original conception of fishing, navigation, and commerce.
The Florida Supreme Court has recognized the public trust and its role
of the public's interests in navigation, commerce, fishing, bathing, and
other rights in cases dating to the early twentieth century. 1 22
The Florida Constitution affirms that the State maintains title to
"lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the state [and]
which have not been alienated . . . in trust for all the people."l 23 The
Florida Constitution also allows for the sale of submerged lands "when
in the public interest."l 24
Although the state constitution allows the sale of submerged lands,
Florida has since passed a statute banning future sales and conveyances
of submerged lands that remain in the public trust.125 Submerged lands
that were previously bequeathed to private owners may remain private,
119. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1421 (9th ed. 2009). Although both civil law and common
law doctrines protect marine waters and their resources, the regimes have a fundamentally
different approach. Under the civil law res communes, such property rights were considered res
nullius, owned by none. Ex parte Powell, 70 So. 392, 396 (Fla. 1915). In a common law regime,
the same property would be owned by all. Id.
120. Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v. McRae, 98 So. 505, 518 (Fla. 1923).
121. See Ex parte Powell, 70 So. at 396.
122. E.g., Perky Props. v. Felton, 151 So. 892, 895 (Fla. 1934) ("The tidal and submerged
lands of the state and the uses thereof are held in trust for all the people of the state . . . .");
Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co., 98 So. at 518-19 (stating that the Spanish law of res communes
was the basis of the public trust doctrine in Florida); Ex parte Powell, 70 So. at 396 ("Under the
laws of this state, the public waters and the fish therein are held by the state for the benefit of the
people of the state, subject to such regulation of the use thereof as the lawmaking power may
provide."); Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 829 (Fla. 1909) (recognizing that the public trust
doctrine, while protecting rights of navigation, fishing, commerce, bathing and "other easements
allowed by law," grant the state the right to convey limited rights over submerged lands, provided
that such conveyances are "for the public welfare").
123. FLA. CONST., art. X § 11. The Florida Legislature passed this provision in 1970. See
Craig, Eastern Public Trust, supra note 108, at 25.
124. FLA. CONST., art. X § 11.
125. FLA. STAT. § 379.232(1) (2008).
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but all other lands are publicly owned. The public's right to fishing in
Florida has also been protected by statute: "No water bottoms owned by
the state shall ever be sold, transferred, dedicated, or otherwise con-
veyed without reserving in the people the absolute right to fish thereon,
excepted as otherwise provided in these statutes."1 26
C. Lease of Submerged Lands Under the Public Trust Doctrine
in Florida
Florida has also had a long history of leasing its submerged lands
under the public trust doctrine, particularly for the harvest of shellfish. A
1925 case from the Florida Supreme Court explains that Florida had
leased water bottoms to private individuals to harvest oysters dating
back to at least 1913,127 a date contemporaneous with that court's origi-
nal pronouncements on the public trust doctrine.128 The court made clear
that Florida inherited this tradition from Spanish law and English com-
mon law, stating that leases for harvesting shellfish "involve[ ] a right in
submerged lands and the waters over them . . . and this right was com-
mon to the public under Spanish rule, as well as under English and
American government."l 29
With these leases came constitutional protections, particularly from
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In 1938, lessees of oyster
beds sued the City of Tampa for discharging two-and-a-half million to
four million gallons of untreated sewage onto their leased oyster beds
daily, damaging the oysters, and preventing the plaintiffs from selling
their oysters.130 The Florida Supreme Court found in favor of the plain-
tiffs, stating that the statutory grant of leases for shellfish aquaculture
"materially altered the common law right of the defendant to empty its
raw sewage into the ocean."131 Consequently, the court held that the
city, by dumping sewage onto leased oyster beds, had violated the plain-
tiffs' due process rights by taking their property without just
compensation. 132
Florida has continued to lease submerged lands for aquaculture
through the Florida Department of Agriculture. 1 33 Laws governing sub-
126. Id. § 379.244(1) (2010).
127. Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co., 98 So. at 516.
128. E.g., Perky Props. v. Felton, 151 So. 892, 895 (Fla. 1934) Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co.,
98 So. at 518-19; Ex parte Powell, 70 So. 392, 396 (Fla. 1915); Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826,
829 (Fla. 1909).
129. Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co., 98 So. at 519 (citations omitted).
130. Gibson v. City of Tampa, 185 So. 319, 320 (Fla. 1938).
131. Id. at 321.
132. Id.
133. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r.18-21 (2012). The Florida Department of Environmental Protection
oversees submerged land leases for docks and related coastal development. Id.
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merged lands for aquaculture primarily focus on shellfish, 1 34 but the
Department of Agriculture has approved leases for live rock, which
includes corals and related organisms destined for the aquarium trade. 3 5
Moreover, Florida's expansive definition of aquaculture is neither lim-
ited to species valued for food use, nor focused entirely on the commer-
cial value of aquaculture.
The Legislature declares that it is in the state's economic, resource
enhancement, and food production interests to promote aquaculture
production of food and nonfood aquatic species . . .. The Legislature
declares that aquaculture shall be recognized as a practicable resource
management alternative . . . to protect and conserve natural
resources, to reduce competition for natural stocks, and to augment
and restore natural populations. Therefore . . . the Legislature
declares that aquaculture is in the public interest.x13
Thus, not only has Florida specifically included aquaculture into its pub-
lic trust doctrine, the state legislature has also explicitly incorporated
notions of conservation into its aquaculture scheme.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: LEASING CORAL REEFS IN FLORIDA
FOR CONSERVATION
It is not a great leap to suggest that similar leases could be created
for the nominal aquaculture of coral reefs under Florida law. Florida has
historically leased submerged lands held in the public trust to private
individuals to harvest shellfish;' 7 more recently, the Florida Division of
Aquaculture, under the Department of Agriculture, has granted sub-
merged land leases for the harvest of live rock, a collection of rock and
dead coral skeleton' upon which live coral, algae, sponges, and other
marine invertebrates grow.13 9 Aquarists use live rock in aquaria as a
proxy for wild coral reefs, because the live rock supports the organisms
in an aquarium in a similar way that wild coral serves as the basis of the
coral reef ecosystem.' 40
If aquaculture leases have been granted for shellfish and live rock,
134. FLA. STAT. § 253.68 (2006).
135. Marine Ornamental Species and Live Rock, FLA. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS.,
http://www.floridaaquaculture.com/bad/aquaproducts_omamentals.htm, (last visited Jan. 14,
2013).
136. § 253.68 (emphases added).
137. See supra Part .C.
138. Coral reefs grow through a constant process of building new skeleton over old tissue. See,
e.g., SHEPPARD ET AL., supra note 19, at 94.
139. WILIAM W. FALLS ET AL., LIvE ROCK AQUACULTURE: FINAL REPORT PREPARED FOR THE
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 2 (2003), available at http://tbsaltwater.com/liverock/LiveRock
Study.pdf.
140. Id.
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what prevents the establishment of a similar lease over an existing wild
coral reef? Instead of granting private users the exclusive right to lease a
discrete area in the ocean for shellfish or live rock aquaculture, the same
lease could be granted to private individuals for coral reef conservation.
Lessees interested in conservation would not be required to harvest the
coral, fish, or other marine resources in the leased area, and instead pre-
vent such extraction through the exclusion of other users.14 1 Finally,
such a lease does not require the invention of a new legal framework,
because Florida law-both the public trust doctrine and aquaculture sta-
tutes-has adequate room for this proposal. 14 2 Granting exclusive use
rights prevents the tragedy of the commons by limiting use of and access
to reefs.
A. How Would a Coral Reef Lease Work?
A lease of a coral reef would resemble existing aquaculture leases
of submerged lands. Aquaculture leases grant lessees the use of sub-
merged lands in the lease, 14 3 as well as the water above, also known as
the water column, "to the extent required by" ongoing aquaculture activ-
ities.'" In granting the lessee use of both submerged lands and the adja-
cent water column, the statutes avoid a potentially murky problem:
whether coral reefs, which form a hard substrate on the ocean floor, are
submerged lands themselves or marine resources in the water column.
Additionally, the lessee is the exclusive owner of all marine resources
that he would culture. 14 5 Together, these statutes make clear that the
lessee would have exclusive use of any corals in a leased area.
A coral reef lease would differ from current aquaculture leases in
one significant way: lessees would not need to harvest the coral or other
resources within the lease. Although the term aquaculture typically
implies harvesting of the cultured resources, 14 6 Florida law does not
mandate such harvest, but instead declares that aquaculture can "protect
and conserve natural resources . . . and . .. augment and restore natural
populations."14 7 Instead of harvesting either coral or the fish that inhabit
the reef, granting a lease to private individuals not to harvest the
resources, but to protect them from use, could satisfy Florida law. This
is because conservation of natural resources is one goal of Florida's
141. FLA. STAT. § 253.72(2) (2000).
142. See infra Part IV.B.
143. FLA. STAT. § 597.010(4) (2009).
144. Id. §§ 253.68-70 (2005).
145. Id. § 597.010(4) ("[A]lI oysters and clams, shell, and cultch grown or placed thereon shall
be the exclusive property of such lessee .... ").
146. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 108 (1993).
147. § 253.68.
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aquaculture laws,14 8 and thus part of Florida's public trust doctrine. A
coral reef lease therefore would resemble existing leases for shellfish
and live rock; the only major difference would be the ultimate goal. In a
proposed lease of a coral reef, the lessee would not harvest the coral in
her lease, but conserve the reef and its living resources.
B. How Would a Lessee Protect His Interests in the Lease?
Property and proprietary interests are meaningless without effective
enforcement.149 A successful lease would not only grant lessees exclu-
sive use of the leased submerged lands and water column, but would
also provide legal protections from any infringement of that exclusive
use by both private actors and government actors.
Excluding other users, including would-be fishermen, is possible
under existing law. Although Florida has protected the public's right to
fishing,15 0 this right has been limited by other statutes, including the
statute that allows lessees exclusive use of the water column.s1 5 If exclu-
sion is "necessary to permit the effective development of the species of
animal or plant life being cultivated by the lessee," the lessee may pre-
vent the public from boating, swimming, or fishing in the lease. 152
Because overfishing and physical contact from swimmers, boats, and
anchors can damage coral reefs,' a lessee seeking to exclude these
users has a strong argument that exclusion is "necessary to .. . the effec-
tive development" of the protected coral. 5 4 Moreover, not only is the
lessee the exclusive user of the resources within the lease, but an addi-
tional statute creates a setback by preventing shellfish harvest within
twenty-five feet of a lease."55 Therefore, Florida law would permit a
lessee to exclude other users from the lease and surrounding area. Grant-
ing such leases would be one way to prevent a given coral reef from
being a commons by restricting access.
Moreover, there are existing mechanisms for enforcing a lessee's
exclusive use rights. One statute requires lessees to post visible markers
that indicate the boundaries of a lease and restrictions on public use
within the lease, effectively serving as a "Keep Out" notice. 5 6 This law
148. FLA. STAT. § 253.68 (2006).
149. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. &
EcoN. 11, 17 (1964).
150. FLA. STAT. § 379.244(1) (2010).
151. Id. § 597.010(4) (2009); see also id. § 379.232(1) (2008).
152. Id. § 253.72(2) (2000).
153. See supra text accompanying note 9.
154. FLA. STAT. § 253.72(2) (2000).
155. Id. § 253.72(3) (2000).
156. Id. § 253.72(1) (2000).
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also makes violations of any posted requirements a second-degree mis-
demeanor.' Florida's aquaculture statutes clearly protect the lessee's
interests from interference by private actors.
Finally, Florida common law also prevents governmental invasions
of the lease. Lessees should be protected from takings without compen-
sation under the Fifth Amendment.' The Florida Supreme Court long
ago found that municipal dumping of sewage onto leased oyster beds
violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 159 The statutory
grant of such a lease, not the lease's purpose, endows the lease with this
constitutional protection.160 The fact that a coral reef lessee would be
using her property differently than would a shellfish lessee does not strip
the coral lessee of the Fifth Amendment safeguards. Therefore, accord-
ing to Florida statutory and common law, the lessee's exclusive use of
the lease area and any resources therein should prevent private or state
actors from violating that use.
C. What Other Considerations Could Emerge from Such a Lease?
To be sure, this proposal is not a foolproof way to protect coral
reefs. In order to satisfy the public trust doctrine, a lessee would need to
demonstrate that she is actively conserving reefs for the benefit of the
public. Attempts to adversely possess or acquire title to establish tradi-
tional private ownership should not succeed.1 61 Accordingly, leases
should be granted to recognized non-governmental organizations, with
157. Id.
158. Gibson v. City of Tampa, 185 So. 319, 321 (Fla. 1938).
159. Id.
160. Id. ("[T]he enactment of .. . [laws] to provide for the propagation and culture of oysters
materially altered the common law right of defendant to empty its raw sewage into the ocean.").
161. Previous attempts by private individuals attempting to acquire title to coral reefs have
failed. In 1969, Mr. Ray Louis, seeking to create the Grand Capri Republic, attempted to
adversely possess and construct several buildings on four coral reefs four-and-a-half miles off of
Elliot Key in South Florida. United States v. Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532, 534 (S.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970) (reversing only one form of relief granted to the
United States). Because this occurred in federal waters, the United States sued Mr. Ray under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a (2006)), claiming that the United
States had jurisdiction over construction in the outer continental shelf. Ray, 294 F. Supp. at 536.
Although the court found that the United States did not have actual possession of the reefs, the
court ruled for the United States by recognizing sovereign interests in preventing such an attempt.
Id. at 542.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a private company's attempt to
acquire title to Kingman Reef, an isolated coral atoll nearly one thousand miles south of Honolulu,
finding that the United States had not abandoned its interests in the atoll. Kingman Reef Atoll
Invs. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2008). This case became moot when
President Bush protected Kingman Reef under the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National
Monument. See U.S. FisH & WILDLIFE SERV., PACIFIC REMOTE ISLANDS MARINE NATIONAL
MONUMENT, available at http://www.fws.gov/pacificremoteislandsmarinemonument/PRIMNM%
20brief.pdf.
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the consent of the state, which serves as the trustee for the public under
the public trust doctrine.
There are additional limitations on the location of such leases. Flor-
ida regulations prevent submerged land leases in state parks; therefore
no lease will be granted in John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park or
Bahia Honda State Park.1 62 Most of the coral reefs in Florida are found
within the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, making these reefs
and submerged lands subject to any sanctuary-specific regulations. For
example, "[m]oving, removing, taking, harvesting, damaging, dis-
turbing, touching, breaking, cutting, or otherwise injuring, or possessing
(regardless of where taken from) any living or dead coral, or coral for-
mation, or attempting any of these activities," is prohibited in the Florida
Keys National Marine Sanctuary without a permit. 163
Additionally, conservation of individual coral reefs will not address
the global crises that reefs are currently facing, like rising sea levels,
warming seas, and increasing ocean acidity. 1 64 However, creating such a
lease, resembling a privately-managed no-take marine reserve, around a
few coral reefs could provide an alternative way to protect reefs where
traditional governance has failed. Nor would such a lease be the first
example of privatizing marine resources in the public trust in American
waters.
V. EXISTING EXAMPLES OF PRIVATIZATION OF MARINE RESOURCES
Historically, the size and fluidity of the marine environment have
made it inherently difficult to enforce any private property rights therein
because of the inability to exclude others. "The oceans are the classic
case of an open access (i.e., no property rights) resource because of their
fluid interconnectedness, their vast size, and the resulting difficulty of
enforcing property rights to any particular area or resource." 165 While
generally true, certain developments over the last half-century have
defied this argument that limiting access to marine resources is impossi-
ble. The United States has created two schemes of discrete private prop-
erty rights: leases of submerged lands for oil and gas production through
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 66 and the development of Indi-
vidual Transfer Quotas in certain fisheries as a way to accommodate
fishery and conservation interests.' 67 Although these schemes have dif-
162. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r.18-21.020(1) (2009).
163. 15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(2) (2012).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
165. Robert Costanza, The Ecological, Economic, and Social Importance of the Oceans, 31
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 199, 204 (1999).
166. 43 U.S.C § 1301 (2006).
167. See infra Part V.B.
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ferent goals and means to achieve those goals, they share one important
factor: they encourage the development of specific private property
rights in order to conserve and use resources protected by the public
trust.
A. Offshore Energy Extraction: Leases of Discrete
Areas in the Ocean
Granting individuals exclusive access to the marine environment is
not a new concept in federal ocean policy. The United States has admin-
istered leases of federal submerged lands, primarily for oil and gas
exploration and extraction, under the Outer Continental Lands Shelf Act
of 1953 ("OCSLA").'68 Through this program, the United States has
allowed leasing of resources that are in the public trust. Although this
federal program has different goals than are proposed in this Note, it is a
useful example of one way in which public trust assets have been suc-
cessfully privatized.
i. How LEASES UNDER OCSLA WORK
Before the enactment of OCSLA, there was a long-running debate
about whether the federal government could lease minerals in sub-
merged lands. Several individuals applied for such leases under the Min-
eral Leasing Act of 1920,169 but were rejected by the Department of
Interior, which claimed that the law did not apply to offshore oil and gas
deposits.170 Even after the United States Supreme Court provided some
(albeit brief) clarification on sovereignty in the oceans,171 the Depart-
ment of Interior continued denying lease applications under the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920.172
168. 43 U.S.C §§ 1331-1356(a) (2006). OCSLA's role in managing alternative energy
sources, like wind or tidal power, remained unclear until the passage of the Energy Policy Act of
2005. 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006); see also Sarah Y. Dicharry, Comment, Wind Energy Production
Compensation Scheme: Oil-Like Royalties or Oyster-Like Rent?, 58 Loy. L. REv. 179, 191
(2012). Because the Energy Policy Act is relatively new and much of the related law remains
unsettled, this discussion will focus only on the older OCSLA scheme.
169. 30 U.S.C §§ 181-195 (2006).
170. Robin Kundis Craig, Treating Offshore Submerged Lands as Public Lands: An Historical
Perspective, PUB. LAND & REsOURCEs L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 12-13) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Craig, Offshore Submerged Lands].
171. For a short time, the United States, and not coastal states, controlled even the first three
miles from shore. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). However, the Court provided
little clarification as to who actually held title over these submerged lands, stating that the federal
government "has paramount rights in and power over" submerged lands within three miles of
shore. Id. at 40; see also Craig, Offshore Submerged Lands, supra note 170, at 11. However,
"Congress decided to 'correct' the Court's holding by 'returning' the first three miles of ocean
submerged lands to the coastal states" with the passage of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. Id.
at 18-19.
172. Id. at 13-14.
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In 1945, concerned about securing access to oil in the wake of
World War 11,173 President Truman claimed all resources on and under
the continental shelf of the United States for the country." 4 Thus, Presi-
dent Truman set the stage for Congress to clarify ownership of sub-
merged lands with the passage of the Submerged Lands Act and OCSLA
in 1953. In the Submerged Lands Act, Congress formally granted title of
submerged lands three nautical miles or less from shore to adjacent
states. 1 5 Under OCSLA, the United States asserted jurisdiction over the
outer continental shelf beyond three nautical miles.' 76
OCSLA authorized the Minerals Management Service ("MMS"),
now known as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management ("BOEM"),17 7
to lease plots of submerged lands on the outer continental shelf for oil
and gas production.17 1 In the Gulf of Mexico, companies seeking such
leases must first "buy" the right to access leased parcels at auction. 7 9
Successful lessees have the right to explore, extract, and produce miner-
als from the plot for five to ten years, possibly longer "if oil and gas
continue to be produced in 'paying quantities."" 8 0 Lessees must also
pay royalties to the BOEM on each barrel of oil produced.' 8 ' Despite the
lengthy application process, the United States has seen considerable
profits from such leases. BOEM currently levies royalties of at least
12.5% of the value of oil and gas produced in the Gulf of Mexico.' 82 In
2001 alone, MMS, BOEM's predecessor, reported over $6.5 billion in
federal revenues from oil and gas royalties, bonuses, and other rents
from these leases.18 3
173. See, e.g., HANNESON, supra note 18, at 31.
174. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945).
175. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2006); see also supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
Off of Texas and Florida's Gulf Coast, state sovereignty extends nine miles from their respective
coasts. See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
177. In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, then Secretary of the Interior Ken
Salazar ordered the reorganization of the MMS into the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and
the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement after criticism that the MMS failed to
properly oversee faulty safety procedures that led to the spill. See Jason DeParle, Minerals Service
Had a Mandate to Produce Results, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/
08/us/08mms.html?pagewanted= 1 &ref=mineralsmanagementservice.
178. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1334-1356 (2006).
179. John A. Duff, Offshore Management Considerations: Law and Policy Questions Related
to Fish, Oil, and Wind, 31 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 395 (2004) (citations omitted).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., GULF OF MEXICO LEASE TERMS AND ROYALTY
RELIEF, (Nov. 5, 2012), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/OilandGas_
Energy-Program/EnergyEconomics/Fair Market Value/GOMLeaseTermsRRSummary.pdf.
183. U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POL'Y, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR TiE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL
REPORT 359 (2004) (citations omitted).
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Despite the financial benefits of OCSLA leases, there are currently
no such leases off Florida's coasts, either in federal or state waters. After
the Deepwater Horizon spill, President Obama and Interior Secretary
Ken Salazar shelved proposals to open leases off Florida's coasts under
OCSLA.184 The moratorium will last at least until 2017.'11 Florida has
banned drilling for oil in state waters since 1990.186 But both the federal
moratorium and the state statutory ban remain controversial, as
lawmakers at the national and state levels have sought to reverse
them.187
ii. LEASES UNDER OCSLA AND LEASES OF CORAL REEFS
Leases under OCSLA are a useful analogue for the kind of lease
proposed in Part IV. In the Submerged Lands Act, Congress explicitly
recognized that it was "in the public interest" to grant states sovereignty
over "the lands beneath navigable waters" three nautical miles from the
shore, "and the natural resources within such lands and waters.""
Although the Submerged Lands Act is not technically part of OCSLA,
the statutes are related and organized together in the United States
Code. 18
The public trust doctrine is also evident in OCSLA. The statute
itself recognizes "the value of the resources [in the outer continental
shelf] and the public interest served by promoting development of the
resources."' Given that the public trust doctrine has protected naviga-
ble bodies of water, there is no reason that the doctrine should not
extend to federal waters in the Exclusive Economic Zone under OCSLA
or the United Nations Law of the Sea treaty.' 9 ' Professor Craig has also
argued that OCSLA has reshaped the common law understanding of
public lands, a term that traditionally meant that the government was
184. John M. Broder & Clifford Krauss, U.S. Halts Plan to Drill in Eastern Gulf, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/us/02drill.html?hp=&pagewanted=print.
185. Id.
186. FLA. STAT. § 377.242(1)(a) (1996); see also Leigh Derenne Braslow, Comment, Coastal
Petroleum's Fight to Drill off Florida's Gulf Coast, 12 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 343, 352 (1997).
187. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss & Ashley Parker, Romney Energy Plan Would Expand Oil
Drilling on U.S. Land and Offshore, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
08/23/us/politics/romney-tries-to-refocus-campaign-on-economy-and-obama-turns-to-education.
html; Trimmel Gomes, Florida Legislature Says No to Offshore Drilling, WFSU (Oct. 4, 2011,
8:16 PM), http://news.wfsu.org/post/florida-legislature-says-no-offshore-drilling.
188. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).
189. The Submerged Lands Act is codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315. OCSLA follows
immediately after the Submerged Lands Act. Id. §§ 1331-1356a.
190. Id. § 1337(k)(2)(B).
191. See Turnipseed et al., supra note 21, at 38-40 (explaining that the complicated proprietary
rights in the Exclusive Economic Zone do not necessarily bar the application of the public trust
doctrine, which can arise directly from the United States' sovereignty).
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free to sell and dispose of such lands as it deemed fit. 19 2 This new view
of public lands, coupled with the statutory context of OCSLA, aligns
OCSLA more closely with the traditional public trust doctrine, in which
the government has a far more limited ability to alienate property.193 The
seeds of the public trust doctrine are present, whether the United States
has ever explicitly recognized it in these waters.19 4 And under that doc-
trine, the United States has created a scheme in which private individu-
als are able to make use of public resources "in the public interest." 9 5
However, there are important differences between leases under
OCSLA and those proposed in this Note. The federal government man-
ages the leases under OCSLA with a limited, but growing, role of adja-
cent states.19 6 By comparison, Florida oversees its own leases of
submerged lands for aquaculture, subject to any relevant federal laws. 97
Additionally, if Florida were to lift its statutory ban on oil exploration in
state waters, it presumably would need to incorporate some of the public
trust language already present in its aquaculture laws.' 9
More importantly, OCSLA is almost entirely concerned with oil
and gas development, which is a very different goal than the lease pro-
posed here. Rather than focusing on resource extraction and use, a lease
for coral conservation is staunchly anti-use, and is proposed partly
because overuse and abuse of coral reefs have led to their decline.
Despite these differences, OCSLA is nevertheless a useful comparison
because it is a clear example of how a government in the United States
(here, the federal government) has managed its public trust resources in
a way that limits access to a particular area in space for the use of pri-
vate organizations.
B. Individual Transfer Quotas: Limiting Access to Living Marine
Resources
Another example of privatizing marine resources is evident in the
relatively new fishing management tool, individual transfer quotas
("ITQs"). The concept of "freedom of the seas," the idea that no sover-
eign could limit the access of another to the oceans, reigned throughout
192. See Craig, Offshore Submerged Lands, supra note 170, at 6.
193. Id. at 39.
194. Tumipseed et al., supra note 21, at 40.
195. § 1337(k)(2)(B).
196. See Rachael E. Salcido, Offshore Federalism and Ocean Industrialization, 82 TUL. L.
REv. 1355, 1370-72 (2008).
197. FLA. STAT. §§ 253.68-75 (2012).
198. Id. § 253.68 (2006). See also Braslow, supra note 186, at 368-69 (arguing that leases to
drill for oil in Florida waters may violate the state's public trust doctrine).
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much of the last millennium.'99 Typically considered one of the last
commons,200 the world's fisheries have undergone a series of regulatory
enclosures over the last half-century.20' In the United States, this process
has shifted from the international and national level, by claiming a two
hundred mile exclusive economic zone, to the regional level with the
development of ITQs in various fisheries around the country.20 2
i. DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL TRANSFER QUOTAS
Throughout much of western history, coastal nations have sought
some form of control over their waters, including access to fishing.203
The most brazen attempt was the 1494 division of the Eastern and West-
ern Hemispheres between Spain and Portugal in the Treaty of Tordesi-
Ilas.204 Other nations, particularly the Dutch, protested and argued that
access to the oceans, and attendant fishing rights, should be generally
free to all nations.205 One exception to this freedom of the seas doctrine
was the territorial sea, in which coastal states sought greater control over
the sea and its resources, particularly fish stocks, in the waters closest to
shore.206 From the 1800s, most countries had accepted three nautical
miles as the limit of the territorial sea, the area in which any sovereign
could regulate fisheries.207
After World War II, the three-mile limit increased up to two hun-
dred nautical miles, spurred by the Truman Proclamations.208 President
Truman claimed all of the resources on the United States' continental
shelf for the country, as well as the right to control fishing in these
waters.209 Other countries responded to the Truman Proclamations by
claiming similar rights to control fisheries in their waters up to two hun-
dred nautical miles from shore.2 10 The Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea finally codified this de facto limit when it was
ratified in 1994.21 1 Although the United States has yet to sign the treaty,
the limit became law in the United States in 1976 with the passage of the
199. See, e.g., HANNESON, supra note 18, at 29-31 (noting that the Dutch, who first coined the
term "freedom of the seas," did so in response to attempts by other countries to control
international trade).
200. See, e.g., id. at 1.
201. Id. at 3.
202. Id. at 135.
203. Id. at 29.
204. DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 2 (2010).
205. HANNESON, supra note 18, at 30.
206. See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 204, at 59-61.
207. See, e.g., HANNESON, supra note 18, at 31.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
210. See HANNESON, supra note 18, at 31-34.
211. Id. at 38.
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Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
("Magnuson-Stevens Act"), claiming for the United States an exclusive
economic zone in waters two hundred miles from shore.212
Since the exclusive economic zone provided a legal basis for con-
trolling access to fisheries, many countries have used ITQs as a fishery
management tool.2 13 An ITQ grants a user the right to catch a certain
amount of fish, either a fixed number of fish or a percentage of the total
catch, over a given time period.214 Rather than establishing a pure prop-
erty right over the fish stock, which would be difficult to do and harder
to enforce, ITQs are a kind of exclusive use right, limiting only access
and use.2 15 In doing so, ITQs are able to limit the number of users and
make the most efficient use of a scarce resource. Limiting the number of
users and the amount of fish removed prevents overfishing and ends the
tragedy of the commons. And by making the quotas easily transferable,
ITQs ensure that the users who can use them most effectively are those
who can pay the most.216
In the United States, ITQs have developed under the Magnuson-
Stevens Act, which created eight regional Fisheries Management Coun-
cils. 217 According to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the councils must
develop management plans for fisheries "to provide optimum yields on a
continuing basis."2 18 Of the eight regions, six councils have developed at
least fifteen management plans under the umbrella term "catch
shares."2 19 According to NOAA, catch shares "include[ ] specific pro-
gram[s] . . . such as 'limited access privilege' (LAP) and 'individual
fishing quota' (IEFQ) 22 0 programs, and other exclusive allocative meas-
ures . . . that grant an exclusive privilege to fish in a geographically
designated fishing ground."221
212. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(6) (2006).
213. HANNESON, supra note 18, at 52.
214. Id. at 56.
215. See, e.g., id. at 53-56.
216. Id. at 57.
217. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (2006).
218. Id. § 1801. But see Marian MacPherson, Integrating Ecosystem Management Approaches
into Federal Fishery Management Through the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 6-7 (2001) (explaining the complicated
relationship between "optimum yield" and "maximum sustainable yield" in the Magnuson-
Stevens Act).
219. NOAA, Catch Shares, OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/
domesfish/catchshare/index.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
220. Individual Fish Quota is another term for ITQs. See, e.g., HANNESON, supra note 18, at
144.
221. NOAA, NOAA CATCH SHARE POLICY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2010).
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ii. INDIVIDUAL TRANSFER QUOTAS AND LEASES OF CORAL REEFS
Like the lease proposed in Part IV, ITQs are a clear example of
access restriction to a right otherwise in the public trust. Both tools are
legal ways to limit full public access to a resource owned by the public;
the only way this paradox works is that the restriction serves to protect
and conserve that resource for the benefit of the public.
However, ITQs are not a perfect comparison to coral reef leases.
ITQs seek to manage a far more mobile resource, fish, than coral reefs,
which generally remain stationary after settling out of their larval phase.
This basic biological difference may actually complicate ITQ enforce-
ment relative to a reef lease: at least with a coral reef, a discrete geo-
graphic area could exist, complete with signs warning boaters and
swimmers not to enter.
Two important additional questions about ITQs remain: are they
effective? And what rights do they actually convey? The first remains
unanswered, and the second unclear. Under political pressure, Congress
imposed a moratorium on the four existing ITQs between 1998 and
2002.222 Consequently, most catch share programs in the United States
were enacted over the last decade. 2 23 The jury is still out as to ITQs'
ability to restore protected stocks around the world.224
In addition to complicating the scientific understanding of ITQs'
effectiveness, the moratorium stalled the development of ITQs' legal
understanding as well. ITQs in the United States are explicit about the
fact that they do not grant users rights, but privileges that are revocable
without compensation. 2 Despite this limitation, ITQs do confer some
rights. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized
"protectable property interest[s]" in the ITQ itself, which are protected
by procedural due process. 226 However, citing the United States
Supreme Court, the court stated that it is "pure fantasy" to think that
222. See HANNESON, supra note 18, at 150-51.
223. NOAA, Catch Shares - Programs by Region, OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES, http://
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfaldomes fish/catchshare/catchshare-region.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2013).
224. See, e.g., Olivier Thdbaud et al., From Anecdotes to Scientific Evidence? A Review of
Recent Literature on Catch Share Systems in Marine Fisheries, 10 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE
ENV'T 433, 435 (2012) (finding a substantial lack of scientific research on the effectiveness of
ITQs); see also Cindy Chu, Thirty Years Later: The Global Growth of ITQs and Their Influence
on Stock Status in Marine Fisheries, 10 FISH & FISHERIES 217, 225 (2009) (noting that twelve of
twenty studied stocks improved after the implementation of ITQs in various countries, but also
explaining how ITQs alone are not always directly responsible for the recovery of fish
populations).
225. HANNESON, supra note 18, at 77.
226. Foss v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Servs., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998).
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there is a property right in the fish themselves.227
Arguably, there is a stronger proprietary interest in aquaculture
leases of submerged lands in Florida. Unlike the federal Magnuson-Ste-
vens Act, which the Ninth Circuit said "does not confer any ... property
rights,"22 8 Florida's aquaculture laws have more explicitly created these
rights. For example, Florida law states that the shellfish in aquaculture
leases are the "exclusive property" of the lessee.229 Moreover, a separate
law makes violation of posted lease restrictions a second-degree misde-
meanor.230 Finally, the Florida Supreme Court has long recognized that
these rights are protected by substantive due process from taking without
just compensation.23'
Finally, the most important difference between ITQs and the pro-
posed reef lease lies in their purposes. The primary goal of ITQs is to
manage depleted fish stocks. 23 2 "It goes without saying that a quota
management system [such as ITQs] is ill suited to deal with questions of
preservation for purposes other than material benefits." 233 The purpose
of the proposal in Part IV, however, is to provide a more holistic
approach to coral conservation by protecting the coral and the fish that
inhabit it.
CONCLUSION
According to the basic principle of the public trust doctrine, the
state serves as trustee over resources in the public trust on behalf of the
public. Given the failing health of U.S. coral reefs, both the federal gov-
ernment and Florida have done a poor job protecting these invaluable
resources. Governance alone has not prevented coral reefs from suffer-
ing the tragedy of the commons. It is time to consider the alternative:
allowing private management schemes to take a more active role in coral
conservation.
The state-here, both the United States and the state of Florida-
cannot and should not surrender this duty completely to private entities;
the public trust doctrine forbids such an action. However, both the fed-
eral and state public trust doctrines have expanded already to include a
growing role for private partnerships. In creating submerged lands leases
under OCSLA and ITQs, the federal government has recognized implic-
itly that the exclusion of the general public in favor of particular individ-
227. Id. (citing Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977)).
228. Id.
229. FLA. STAT. § 597.010(4) (2009).
230. Id. § 253.72(1) (2000).
231. Gibson v. City of Tampa, 185 So. 319, 321 (Fla. 1938).
232. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
233. HANNESON, supra note 18, at 91.
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uals can be in the public's best interest. Florida has gone further,
welcoming private individuals to participate in its public trust doctrine
by expressly granting the right to lease submerged lands for aquaculture.
Florida should take this privatization one step further to advance its
coral reef conservation strategies. Such a step would require little legal
invention, but merely a refashioning of existing aquaculture laws, which
have been a part of Florida law for over a century. Given the dire status
of Florida's reefs, failure to take any action would be a violation of
public trust principles.
